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 *J.B.L. 253  Abstract 
The incontestability clause, i.e. "this policy is incontestable after two years from date of 
issue …", restricts the insurer to a definite time within which to discover any non-disclosure 
or misrepresentation made by the insured at the time of the contract, and precludes the 
insurer from contesting the validity of the contract after the specified period lapses. This 
article considers the incontestability provision in English and Chinese law, with a 
comparative analysis of the approaches in some other common law and civil law 
jurisdictions. It is suggested that an incontestability provision should be introduced to the 
Consumer Insurance (Disclosure and Representations) Act 2012 in its future amendment. 
This article also proposes solutions to the shortcomings in the incontestability provision in 
Chinese law. 
 
 Introduction  
An insurance contract is a contract of utmost good faith.1 Under this principle the insured 
must, at the time of the contract, disclose relevant information to the insurer about the 
subject-matter and the nature of the insurance. Based on the information disclosed by the 
insured, the insurer can decide whether or not to accept the risk and, if so, on what terms. 
If the insured is in breach of the duty of disclosure, the insurer may avoid the contract at 
any time during the insurance period.2 If there is *J.B.L. 254  no time-limit for the insurer 
to excise his right of avoidance the insurer may abuse his right. In order to prevent the 
insurer from abusing the right of avoidance, the doctrine of incontestability has been 
adopted in law and practice in many jurisdictions.3 
The incontestability clause in its simplest form provides that: "This policy will be 
indisputable from any cause (except fraud) after it shall have been continuously in force for 
two years."4 It is said that the most basic and important clause in a life insurance policy is 
the incontestable clause.5 The purpose of such a clause is to restrict the insurer to a 
definite period of time within which to discover any non-disclosure or misrepresentation 
    Page2 
made by the insured at the time of applying for the insurance and to take appropriate 
action to rescind the contract, amend the terms of contract, or raise the premium. It 
prevents the insurer from invoking the defence of non-disclosure or misrepresentation 
after the specified period of time expires. 
The justification for the incontestability clause is that a claim might be denied by the 
insurer on the ground of non-disclosure or misrepresentation made by the insured in his 
application many years before death took place, and it might be difficult either to prove or 
to disprove the truth of the disclosure or representation in question, particularly when the 
insured would not be available to testify about the application. It is, therefore, desirable 
that the application, which is the basis of the contract, be finally accepted as correct or 
rejected within a reasonable period of time after the contract is entered into. The clause 
protects the insured from having to defend against a possible specious challenge long after 
acquisition of the policy, and thus the insured’s or beneficiaries’ expectation and reliance 
on the existence of the coverage. The clause also encourages the insurer to be diligent to 
investigate any alleged non-disclosure or misrepresentation within the specified period. 
English insurers created the first incontestable (or indisputable) clause in life insurance 
policies in 18436 which was in later years adopted by insurers in many other countries.7 
English rules of law relating to the insured’s pre-contract duty of disclosure and 
representations were first developed in common law in the 18th and 19th centuries and 
codified in the Marine Insurance Act 1906 (MIA).8 These rules apply to marine and 
non-marine insurance on the basis that it embodies the common law.9 The principle of 
utmost good faith, non-disclosure and *J.B.L. 255  misrepresentation was also adopted in 
other common law jurisdictions, such as Australia, New Zealand, Hong Kong and the US; 
and civil jurisdictions, such as China, Macau, Taiwan and Germany. However, all of these 
jurisdictions have reformed their laws in relation to the insured’s pre-contract duty of 
disclosure and representations and remedies for breach of the duty to be more 
insured-friendly. One of these reforms was to introduce an incontestability provision in 
their statutory laws.10 
The doctrine of incontestability was for the first time introduced into the Chinese Insurance 
Law in 2009.11 The insurer is entitled to rescind the contract where the insured breaches 
his duty of disclosure intentionally or by gross negligence and the undisclosed 
circumstances are material,12 but the insurer’s right of rescission must be exercised within 
30 days after the insurer becomes aware of the cause for rescission or within two years 
from the time of conclusion of the contract. After these time-limits lapse, the insurer is 
barred from contesting the validity of the contract on the ground of non-disclosure or 
misrepresentation.13 The incontestability provision plays an active role in preventing the 
insurer from abusing his right of rescinding contracts and in protecting the insured or his 
beneficiaries, but it is not free from difficulties. 
This article considers incontestability provisions in English law and Chinese law, with a 
comparative analysis of the approaches in some other common law jurisdictions (Australia, 
New Zealand, Hong Kong and the US) and civil law jurisdictions (Germany, Macau and 
Taiwan), in order to make a suggestion as to the question whether an incontestability 
provision should be introduced to the Consumer Insurance (Disclosure and 
Representations) Act 2012 (UK) in the future amendment of this Act; to identify and 
discuss shortcomings in the contestability provision in the Chinese Insurance Law; and to 
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propose solutions to these problems. 
 
 Historical consideration of the incontestability clause in life policies in 
England  
In the 19th century, life insurers often abused the defence of non-disclosure or breach of 
warranty by the insured to invalidate life policies.14 In order to dispel the general public’s 
fear that insurers would refuse to pay insurance benefits under a life insurance policy owing 
to the insured’s non-disclosure, some life insurers voluntarily adopted the incontestability 
clause in their policies. *J.B.L. 256  15 
The incontestability clause was first used by an English company, the London, Edinburgh 
and Dublin Life Assurance Company.16 The company placed a short advertisement in the 
London Post Office Directory 1843, which said:  
"Important improvements have been introduced into the practice of Life Assurance by this 
company … This company has rendered their Policies indefeasible and negotiable securities 
by the following clause in their Deed of Settlement: Clause 78—‘That every Policies issued 
by the Company shall be INDEFEASIBLE AND INDISPUTABLE; and the fact of the issuing 
the same shall be conclusive evidence of its validity; and it shall not be lawful for the 
Company to delay payment of the money assured thereby, on the ground of any error, 
mistake, or omission, however important, made by or on the part of the person or persons 
effecting the same; and that, on the contrary, the amount receivable under the same shall 
be paid at the time stipulated by the Policy, to the person entitled thereto, as if no such 
error, mistake, or omission had been made or discovered, unless the Policy shall have been 
obtained by fraudulent misrepresentation.’" 17 
 Another English company, the London Indisputable Life, which was organised in 1848, had 
its deed of constitution prohibit it from disputing a policy  
"upon any ground whatsoever. All questions as to age, health, habits and other matters 
deserving of inquiry prior to the contract being entered into, are held as finally settled when 
the assured received his policy".18 
 The first known case to bestow judicial approval upon incontestable clauses was Wood v 
Dwarris in 1856,19 in which the insurer’s prospectus said that all policies were indisputable 
except in cases of fraud. The insured was induced to effect the policy in question upon the 
faith of such representation. Although the declaration made by the insured in the proposal 
form contained a false and untrue statement, the statement was not fraudulent, and thus 
the policy was held to be indisputable. In 1858, a similar case, Wheelton v Hardisty,20 was 
reported. 
From the reported cases, the common law position relating to the doctrine of 
incontestability in life policies in England21 is that if a life policy is expressed to be 
incontestable, the life insurer cannot raise any question of non-disclosure, except where 
the policy was procured by fraud on the part of the contracting party22; this is so even if 
there is no express exception of fraud in the policy.23 Where the life insurers advertise in 
their prospectus that their policies are "indisputable", if the insured can prove that he 
effected a policy on the faith of such a statement in a *J.B.L. 257  prospectus,24 the 
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insurer is precluded from relying on a breach of a warranty by the insured that his 
statements were true.25 An incontestable clause does not preclude the insurer from 
relying on their common law right to avoid the policy for fraudulent misrepresentation.26 
The words "except in the case of fraud" are sometimes added to the incontestable clause to 
make this position clear to the insured. Nor does an incontestable clause prevent the 
insurer from alleging that the policy is void for lack of insurable interest.27 
English law relating to insureds’ duty of disclosure and representations was provided by the 
MIA 1906. The law imposed a duty on the insured to voluntarily disclose information to the 
insurer which would "influence the judgment of a prudent insurer" in fixing the premium or 
deciding whether to take the risk. If the insured failed to perform the duty, the insurer 
would avoid the contract ab initio and refuse all claims under it. The law was very harsh to 
the consumer. So the Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission recommended 
the creation of a new consumer statute to reset the pre-contract duty of good faith for a 
consumer insured.28 Consequently, the Consumer Insurance (Disclosure and 
Representations) Act 2012 (CIDRA) was enacted in March 2012.29 
The law relating to consumers’ duty of representation is now provided by CIDRA, which has 
removed the insureds’ duty to volunteer information to the insurer. Instead consumers 
need only answer the insurer’s questions carefully and honestly. The onerous duty to 
disclose to the insurer "every material circumstance" which the insured "knows or ought to 
know" has been replaced by the duty "to take reasonable care not to make a 
misrepresentation to the insurer".30 
If a consumer breaches this duty and this misrepresentation induces the insurer to enter 
into the contract, the insurer will have a remedy which depends on the nature of the 
consumer’s misrepresentation and the consumer’s state of mind:  
 
•For an honest and reasonable misrepresentation, the insurer must pay the 
claim. The consumer is expected to exercise the standard of care of a 
reasonable consumer, taking into account a range of factors including the 
type of insurance policy and the clarity of the insurer’s question. 
 
•For a deliberate or reckless misrepresentation,31 the insurer is entitled to 
avoid the contract and refuse all claims. The insurer may also retain the 
premium unless it would be unfair to do so. *J.B.L. 258  32 
 
•For a careless misrepresentation, in respect of claim,33 the insurer’s 
remedies are based on what he would have done if the consumer had 
complied with the duty to take reasonable care not to make a 
misrepresentation. If the consumer would not have entered into the contract 
on any terms, the insurer may avoid the contract and refuse all claims, but 
must return the premium paid. If the insurer would have entered the contract 
on different terms, the contract may be taken to include those different 
terms. If the premium would have been higher, the insurer must reduce 
proportionately the amount to be paid on a claim.34 
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•For careless misrepresentation, in respect of treatment of contract for the 
future,35 if the insurer would not have entered into the contract at all, the 
insurer may avoid the contract and must return the premium. This means 
that the contract no longer exists, and the insurer may refuse all past and 
future claims. However, where the insurer would have contracted on 
different terms or for a higher premium (or both): (1) in non-life insurance, 
either side is entitled to terminate future cover on reasonable notice; (2) for 
life insurance, the insurer is not allowed to terminate the contract and must 
continue the policy either on the existing terms or on amended terms.36 
 
 The CIDRA has improved the insured’s position in respect of pre-contract duty of 
disclosure and representation. However, an incontestability provision has not been 
provided in CIDRA, although the Law Commissions considered the issue of introducing an 
incontestability provision in consumer life insurance. In the Issues Paper 2006,37 the Law 
Commissions raised the issue of a cut-off period for life insurance by asking whether in 
consumer life insurance the insurer should be prevented from relaying on any 
non-fraudulent misrepresentation after the policy has been in force for three years. This 
question excited considerable comment, and strong arguments were put both for and 
against the proposal.38 In the Consultation Paper 2007, the Law Commissions proposed to 
extend the contestability period from three years to five years, considering the fact that 
many insurers do not conduct a full investigation of past medical records where the life 
insured’s death has taken place more than five years later. This would therefore not add 
greatly to costs, but would reassure consumers that insurers will not make technical points 
by dragging through old records many years after the events. *J.B.L. 259  39 Responses 
were again split on the issue whether, in consumer life insurance, insurers should be 
prevented from relying on a negligent misrepresentation after the policy has been in force 
for five years. Of the 61 consultees who addressed this issue, 34 were in favour; 24 
thought that there should not be a cut-off period; while 3 preferred the shorter period of 
three years.40 A majority of insurers (including most life insurers) opposed the proposal on 
the ground that it would lead to more misrepresentation in life policies and would increase 
costs. Insurers feared the effect of such a rule on consumer behaviour. In the 2009 report, 
41 the Law Commissions eventually did not recommend that the law should prevent 
insurers from obtaining a remedy for a careless misrepresentation because a set period has 
passed since the misrepresentation was made. So the five-year contestability period was 
not included in the Bill of CIDRA. 
The Law Commissions did not raise the issue of a cut-off period for non-consumer 
insurance in the 2006 Issues Paper.42 The incontestability provision is also not included in 
the Insurance Act 2015.43 The duty of disclosure for non-consumer insurance is replaced 
with a duty of fair presentation by this Act.44 The insurer has a remedy for a breach of the 
duty of fair presentation if the insurer can show that but for the breach it would not have 
entered into the contract at all, or would have done so only on different terms.45 The 
insurer may avoid the contract for deliberate, reckless or even "innocent" breach of the 
duty if the insurer can show inducement, and the insurer’s right of avoidance is not 
time-barred.46 
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In many other common law or civil law jurisdictions,47 statutory law is enacted to require 
an insurer to include an incontestability clause in life policies or to impose a time-limit 
within which the insurer may exercise his right of avoiding a life contract on the ground of 
non-disclosure or misrepresentation. This offers a much stronger protection to the insured. 
Then a question may be raised here: should an incontestability provision be introduced to 
CIDRA in its amendment in the future? 
Before answering this question, it is helpful and appropriate to look at the development and 
content of the incontestability provisions in some other jurisdictions. 
 
 Incontestability provisions in other jurisdictions  
 
Australia 
In Australia, life policies are commonly made incontestable after a fixed period, usually 
three years.48 This principle was enshrined in legislation in Australia by *J.B.L. 260  s.84 
of the Life Insurance Act 1945,49 which prevented the avoidance of a life policy for written 
misrepresentation after three years from its inception. This section was reformed to take 
the form of s.29 of the Insurance Contracts Act 1984 (ICA).50 
Section 29 of the ICA represents the current statutory position relating to the doctrine of 
incontestability in Australia. It applies where the person who became the insured under a 
contract of life insurance upon the contract being entered into: (a) failed to comply with the 
duty of disclosure; or (b) made a misrepresentation to the insurer before the contract was 
entered into; but does not apply where: (c) the insurer would have entered into the 
contract even if the insured had not failed to comply with the duty of disclosure or had not 
made the misrepresentation before the contract was entered into; or (d) the failure or 
misrepresentation was in respect of the date of birth of one or more of the life insureds.51 
If the failure was fraudulent or the misrepresentation was made fraudulently, the insurer 
may avoid the contract at any time.52 If the failure was not fraudulent or the 
misrepresentation was not made fraudulently,53 the insurer may, within three years after 
the contract was entered into, avoid the contract.54 If the insurer has right of avoidance 
but choose not to exercise the right, he is entitled to scale down the amount of recovery by 
reference to the proportion which the actual premium bears to the premium that would 
have been charged.55 
By virtue of s.29 of the ICA, the insurer is entitled to avoid the contract if he can prove 
fraud on the part of the insured and prove that he would not have entered into the contract 
on any terms but for the misrepresentation or non-disclosure. In the absence of fraud, the 
right of avoidance is retained for an insurer who would not have entered into the contract 
on any terms irrespective of the state of mind of the insured in presenting the risk56; but 
he must exercise the right of avoidance within the three-year contestability period. An 
insurer who would have entered *J.B.L. 261  into the contract but on different terms has 
no right of avoidance for an innocent or negligent misrepresentation or failure to 
disclose.57 
The incontestability provision applies only to life insurance and not to general insurance, 
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for which the insurer may avoid the contract for fraudulent non-disclosure or 
misrepresentation, but not for innocent non-disclosure or innocent misrepresentation.58 If 
the insurer is not entitled to avoid the contract or, being entitled to avoid the contract has 
not done so, the liability of the insurer in respect of a claim is reduced to the amount that 
would place the insurer in a position in which the insurer would have been if the failure had 
not occurred or the misrepresentation had not been made.59 
In Australia, the insurer has no right to avoid the contract for misstatement of age in all 
cases, including those of fraud. Instead, the apportionment principle is applied.60 
In comparing English law with the Australian counterpart, the remedy for deliberate or 
reckless (or fraudulent) misrepresentation is the same in CIDRA and ICA, that is, to avoid 
the contract. The remedy for careless (or non-fraudulent) misrepresentation is different in 
that under CIDRA, an insurer who would not have entered into the contract on any terms 
has right to avoid the contract at any time61; while under s.29 of the ICA, an insurer who 
would not have entered into the contract on any terms has the right of avoidance within 
three years from the inception of the contract. It is submitted that the Australian approach 
is fairer. 
 
New Zealand 
In New Zealand,62 the first legislation relating directly to the life insurance industry was 
the Life Insurance Companies Act 1873, which was modelled on the Life Assurance Act 
1870 (UK). The Life Insurance Policies Act was enacted in 1884. These two legislations 
were consolidated to form the Life Insurance Act 1908, which, with its amendments, has 
ever since been the principal enactment governing the operation and oversight of the life 
insurance industry in New Zealand.63 The Insurance Law Reform Act 1977 made 
substantial changes to law relating to misrepresentation by the insured. The 
incontestability provision was introduced into s.4 of this Act. A life policy cannot be avoided 
by reason only of a statement (other than a statement as to the age of the life insured) 
unless the statement was *J.B.L. 262  substantially incorrect,64 material65 and made 
either fraudulently66 or within the period of three years immediately preceding the date on 
which the policy is sought to be avoided or the date of the death of the life insured, 
whichever is the earlier.67 The insured cannot avoid a life policy by reason only of 
misstatement of the age of the life insured.68 
In May 1998 the New Zealand Law Commission published its report Some Insurance Law 
Problems,69 in which it was recommended that  
"any right that an insured’s non-fraudulent non-disclosure gives the insurer to cancel the 
contract from its inception should have a time-limit. That time-limit would mean the right 
was exercisable only within the period that begins with the risk first attaching70 and ends 
10 working days later".71 
Subsequently, in November 2004, the Law Commission published a further report, Life 
Insurance,72 which reaffirmed the recommendation set out in the 1998 Report.73 
In the 2004 Report,74 the Law Commission annexed a draft Insurance Contracts Bill.75 
Clause 10 of the Bill deals with misrepresentation in life policy, which re-enacts 
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substantially s.4 of the Insurance Law Reform Act 1977. Clauses 14 and *J.B.L. 263  15 of 
the Bill modify the insurer’s common law right to avoid a contract (that is, terminate the 
contract with retrospective effect where the insured has failed to disclose a material fact) 
for non-disclosure in accordance with the Law Commission’s recommendations in the 1998 
Report.76 Clause 14(1) of the Bill states:  
"A right of an insurer to avoid a contract of insurance because of the failure of an insured 
to disclose a fact to the insurer before the contract was entered into may be exercised only 
within 10 working days of the risk first attaching." 77 
 In September 2006, the New Zealand Ministry of Economic Development published 
Review of Financial Products and Providers: Insurance. Some proposals for remedies for 
non-disclosure and misrepresentation for both life and non-life insurance were set out in 
the review. It is proposed that the duty of disclosure be retained, but the rights of an 
insurer to avoid a contract of insurance owing to non-disclosure or misrepresentation be 
limited to four circumstances78:  
 
1.  
In the case of fraud:  
a misrepresentation or non-disclosure is fraudulent where, for instance, the 
insured making the presentation or failing to disclose does so intentionally or 
recklessly. 
 
2.  
Specific answer to a specific question put by the insurer:  
where the misrepresentation or non-disclosure is contained in an answer to a 
specific question expressly put by the insurer, and is substantially incorrect 
and material.79 
 
3.  
Where the insurer seeks to avoid the contract within 10 days 
of the risk first attaching:  
this caters for the market practice of interim cover to allow time for the 
insurer to ask questions. The time allowed may need to be longer than 10 
days.80 
 
4.  
Where the contract is for reinsurance:  
where the contract relates to reinsurance the parties are deemed to know the 
duty and have ability to discharge their disclosure obligations. In all other 
cases avoidance is removed and is replaced with restitutionary remedies. 
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*J.B.L. 264  81 
 
 In the paper Insurance: Contracts, Agency and Assignments,82 the Hon. Lianne Dalziel 
(Minister of Commerce) recommended that the time-limit for an insurer to avoid a life or 
non-life policy on the ground of non-disclosure or misrepresentation is 30 working days 
(not 10 days) from the risk first attaching. 
In summary, the current legal position relating to the doctrine of incontestability in life 
insurance is provided in s.4 of the Insurance Law Reform Act 1977: a life insurer’s right to 
avoid the policy on the ground of misrepresentation (not non-disclosure) needs to be 
exercised within three years from the date when the misrepresentation was made to the 
date of avoidance or the date of the death of the life insured, whichever is the earlier. After 
the three-year period expires, the insurer is barred from avoiding the contract on the 
ground of misrepresentation, except in the case of fraud. The insured cannot avoid a life 
policy by reason only of misstatement of the age of the life insured.83 According to the 
present state of the New Zealand proposals, the time-limit for an insurer to avoid a life or 
non-life policy on the ground of non-disclosure or misrepresentation is 30 working days 
from the risk first attaching. 
 
US 
The first American company to adopt an incontestable policy was Manhattan Life, which, in 
1861, made its policies incontestable after five years "for or on account of errors, omissions, 
and misstatements in the application, except as to age".84 Following the insurer’s 
voluntary practice, the first statute requiring an incontestable clause was enacted in New 
York in 1906 in the wake of the Armstrong investigation, and in the following decades 
similar legislation was taken in many other states.85 Over many years, a significant body 
of common law rules have been developed for various circumstances in the application of 
incontestability clause in life policies, health policies, disability policies, etc.86 
In a few states in the US, statutes explicitly except fraudulent misrepresentations from the 
applicability of the incontestability clause or give the insurer the option to narrow the 
clause in that respect.87 In New Jersey, for example, an insured may not recover under a 
disability insurance policy for a disease that he or she intentionally concealed when 
applying for the policy, even if there is an incontestable clause in the policy and the 
specified two-year period expires. *J.B.L. 265   
The case of Paul Revere Life Insurance Co v Gilbert K. Haas88 explains how the New Jersey 
court interprets and applies the statutory provision in relation to incontestability, which 
provides:  
"After 2 years from the date of issue of this policy no misstatements, except fraudulent 
misstatements, made by the applicant in the application for such policy shall be used to 
void the policy or to deny a claim for loss incurred or disability (as defined in the policy) 
commencing after the expiration of such 2-year period." 89 
 In this case, the issue is whether a statutorily mandated incontestability clause included in 
a disability policy precludes the insurer from denying a claim when the insured intentionally 
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failed to disclose a disabling disease in the insurance application. There, the insured 
intentionally concealed the fact that he had known for about four years that he was 
suffering from retinitis pigmentosa (a progressive disease of the eyes that leads to 
blindness). Relying on the insured’s false statements, the insurer issued a disability policy 
in March 1987. The policy contained an incontestability clause required by statute.90 In 
January 1991, the insured executed a proof of claim stating that as of 1 December 1990 he 
had become totally disabled because of retinitis pigmentosa. The insurer’s investigation of 
that claim revealed that the insured had lied in his application. The court ruled that an 
insured may not recover under a disability insurance policy for a disease that he or she 
intentionally concealed when applying for the policy. 
Sometimes courts allow a fraud defence notwithstanding an incontestability clause if the 
insured’s fraud at the time of applying for insurance is so profound that public policy would 
be disserved by enforcing the policy.91 Similarly, in some states, if a person applies for 
insurance through the use of an imposter, the incontestability clause will not bar the 
insurer from contesting coverage.92 But in some other states,93 an incontestability clause 
bars the insurer’s impostor defence.94 
In California, for instance, after the expiration of the contestability period, the insurer was 
not allowed to assert the defence that the insured has used an imposter to take the medical 
examination. In Amex Life Assurance Co v Superior Court,95 a viatical settlement company 
which had purchased a life policy from the insured shortly before he died of AIDS was 
entitled to the proceeds of the policy, and the insurer was not allowed to assert the defence 
of misrepresentation, even though the insured had used an imposter to take the medical 
examination and thereby misrepresent his health status. The court was of the view that the 
incontestability clause requires the insurer to investigate fraud before it issues the policy or 
within two years afterwards. The insurer may not accept the premiums for two years and 
investigate a possible defence only after the beneficiaries file a claim. Here, the insurer 
could have easily discovered the fraud at the outset, as the insured on the *J.B.L. 
266  application was four inches shorter and 30 pounds lighter than the person who took 
the medical examination. The insurer ignored this information and merely accepted the 
premiums for the entire period of contestability. Then it became too late to claim for the 
first time that an impostor took the medical examination. Beneficiaries have the right to 
expect that after the premiums are paid for the specified time, the insurer will promptly pay 
the policy proceeds upon the insured’s death. The incontestability clause protects that 
right. 
After the case of Amex Life Assurance was decided, the California legislature enacted 
statutes that voided any insurance contract from its inception "if photographic 
identification is presented during the application process, and if an imposter96 is 
substituted for a named insured in any part of the application process".97 
 
Germany 
In the German Insurance Contract Act 2008, if the insured intentionally or by gross 
negligence breaches his duty of disclosure, the insurer has right to withdraw from the 
contract98; if the insured’s breach was neither intentional nor by gross negligence, the 
insurer has right to terminate the contract subject to a notice period of one month.99 The 
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insurer must assert these rights in writing within one month from the time when the insurer 
becomes aware of the breach.100 The insurer’s right to withdraw from the contract on 
account of grossly negligent non-disclosure and his right to terminate the contract where 
the insured’s breach was neither intentional nor by gross negligence shall be ruled out if the 
insurer would also have concluded the contract in the knowledge of the undisclosed facts 
(albeit with other conditions).101 
The rights of the insurer to terminate the contract by reason of the insured’s breach of his 
duty of disclosure by neither intentional nor gross negligence shall lapse five years after the 
contract was entered into. If the insured has breached the duty of disclosure intentionally 
or by acting fraudulently, this period shall be 10 years within which the insurer can exercise 
his right to withdraw the contract. This is in contrast to the approaches in the common law 
jurisdictions in that in German law, intentional or fraudulent non-disclosure is not an 
exception to the incontestability of the contract, but the contestability period is longer (i.e. 
10 years). *J.B.L. 267   
 
Hong Kong 
Hong Kong is a common law jurisdiction.102 There are two major insurance legislations in 
Hong Kong: the Insurance Companies Ordinance (Cap. 41) and the Marine Insurance 
Ordinance (Cap. 329). The latter is more or less identical to the Marine Insurance Act 1906 
(UK). There is no specific legislation dealing with non-marine insurance which is governed 
by common law.103 The current legal position relating to non-disclosure and 
misrepresentation in Hong Kong is that the insured is required to disclose to the insurer, 
before the contract is concluded, every material circumstance which he knows or ought to 
know. If the insured fails to make such a disclosure, the insurer may avoid the contract.104 
The insured is also under a duty to avoid positive misrepresentation. The insurer may avoid 
the contract for material misrepresentation.105 The harshness of the statutory law is to 
some extent mitigated by the Code of Conduct for Hong Kong Insurers.106 English law in 
relation to consumers’ non-disclosure and misrepresentation has been radically changed 
by CIDRA, so legislators in Hong Kong might need to seriously consider insurance law 
reform by taking into account the local situation of the insurance industry and the need to 
protect the insureds.107 
As far as the doctrine of incontestability is concerned, there is no statutory incontestability 
provision in Hong Kong. The common law rules governing incontestability are summarised 
by Professor Merkin in his book Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance in Hong Kong.108 Life 
insurers often advertise in their prospectus and sometimes insert a statement in their 
policies that they are "incontestable". If such a statement is included in a policy, or the 
insured can prove that he effected a policy on the faith of such a statement in a 
prospectus,109 the insurer is barred from relying on the defence of a breach of warranty by 
the insured.110 But the incontestability clause does not apply to bar the insurer from 
exercising his common law right to avoid the policy for fraudulent misrepresentation. 
*J.B.L. 268  111 
 
Macau 
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In Macau, insurance contract law is included in the Commercial Code. 112 The insured’s 
duty of disclosure and representation and remedies for breach of the duty are provided in 
arts 973 to 975 of the Commercial Code. The incontestability provision is stipulated in 
art.1041 of the Code. The insureds are required, up to the time of conclusion of the 
contract, to declare to the insurer in a complete and unequivocal manner all circumstances 
which they know or ought to know and which may influence the assessment of risk. In 
addition to truthfully answering the questions raised in the questionnaire, they must 
voluntarily disclose information to the insurer.113 
If the insured omitted or misrepresented, in bad faith,114 any of the material 
circumstances, the contract shall be voidable and the insurer can claim the return of any 
compensation already paid. The insurer loses the right of avoidance if he does not inform 
the insured of its intention to avoid, within one month from the date when he becomes 
aware of the non-disclosure or misrepresentation.115 
If the non-disclosure or misrepresentation was not made in bad faith, the insurer can, 
within two months from the date when he gained knowledge of such non-disclosure or 
misrepresentation either rescind the contract or propose a new premium to the insured. 
The rescission of the contract becomes effective 15 days after serving a notice of rescission 
to the insured.116 
The insured’s right to avoid or rescind the contract must be exercised either within one year 
from the time of conclusion of the contract, or within a period stipulated in the contract, if 
the latter is shorter. This incontestability provision does not apply in the case of intentional 
non-disclosure or misrepresentation.117 
 
Taiwan 
Article 64 of the Taiwan Insurance Act is concerned with the insured’s duty of disclosure, 
representation and the incontestability provision.118 The insured is required to make 
truthful representation to the written inquiries of the insurer at the time of applying for the 
insurance contract. If the insured has made any intentional concealment, negligent 
non-disclosure or misrepresentation, and such concealment, non-disclosure or 
misrepresentation are sufficient to alter or diminish the insurer’s estimation of the risk to 
be undertaken, the insurer is entitled to rescind the contract. The insurer’s right of 
rescission shall also apply after the risk has occurred. The insurer is not entitled to rescind 
the contract where the insured can prove that the occurrence of the risk was not connected 
with any fact disclosed or undisclosed. The right to rescind shall be extinguished if not 
exercised within one month from the time the insurer knows of the cause for rescission. 
Once two years *J.B.L. 269  have elapsed after the contract is entered into, the contract 
may not be rescinded even if cause for rescission exists. 
In summary, all jurisdictions (except England and Hong Kong) as mentioned above have 
statutory incontestability provisions to restrict insurers’ right to avoid contracts by reason 
of non-disclosure or misrepresentation within certain period of time. The contestability 
period varies from one year in Macau, two years in Taiwan and in 41 states of the US,119 
three years in Australia and New Zealand, five years for non-intentional non-disclosure in 
Germany, to 10 years for intentional non-disclosure in Germany. As a rule the 
incontestability provision does not apply to fraudulent non-disclosure or fraudulent 
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misrepresentation in most of these jurisdictions except in some states in the US. In 
addition, in some jurisdictions (including Germany, Macau and Taiwan), the insurers must 
exercise their right of avoidance within one month from the time they become aware of the 
non-disclosure or misrepresentation. 
 
 Suggestion for CIDRA’s amendment in the future  
The incontestability provision is not included in CIDRA owing to the fact that most insurers 
opposed the Law Commissions’ proposal of a cut-off period for the situation where the 
insured’s careless misrepresentation induced the insurer entering into the contract. This 
represents a missed opportunity to introduce the incontestability provision into the 
legislation, and consequently leaves English law out of line with its common law and civil 
law counterparts in this respect. It is suggested that the incontestability provision should 
be introduced to CIDRA in its amendment in the future for the following reasons: 
First, the security and certainty of a life policy are of paramount importance to the insured 
or beneficiary. The security which the insured acquires through the incontestability 
provision against the possibility of a challenge by the insurer to the policy’s validity at a 
later time outweighs the disadvantage of a possibly higher premium for purchasing the 
policy. No insured would want a policy that did not eliminate the possibility of being made 
invalid when the insured event occurs. An incontestability provision would boost 
consumers’ trust and encourage consumers to take out insurance policies.120 
Secondly, the incontestability provision requires and encourages the insurer to investigate 
misrepresentation before it issues the policy or within the contestability period afterwards. 
The insurer should not be allowed to accept the premiums for the contestability years and 
investigate a possible defence only after the insured or beneficiaries file a claim. 
Investigations would increase costs and premiums; however, the insured would rather pay 
a slightly higher premium for a secured policy. As mentioned by the Law Commissions,121 
at present most life insurers do not investigate misrepresentation made more than five 
years previously in the absence of evidence of fraud. It would increase consumer 
confidence if this good industry practice could be built into law, without adding 
substantially to costs. The figures from the US which measure the number of successful 
claims against the *J.B.L. 270  number predicted from the actuarial models show a higher 
than anticipated pay-out in year 3 and 4 but little effect in year 6 onwards. This would lead 
to suggestions that consumers have misdescribed the risk. If the contestability period is for 
five years instead of three years, the cases with misdescribed risk can be contested during 
the five-year period and the insured who misrepresented the risk will not get away with it. 
Thirdly, a contestability period would not encourage fraud as it is not proposed to apply in 
the case of a deliberate or reckless misrepresentation. 
Finally, if the incontestability provision is introduced to CIDRA, it should apply to all 
long-term insurance policies, such as term polices (10, 20 or more years), endowment 
policies, whole life policies, investment contracts in the form of life policies, life policies with 
critical illness cover, etc. In the Law Commissions’ proposal,122 life insurance was the only 
insurance product in the whole protection range that was included, despite critical illness 
insurance being the protection product mainly associated with the problems of declined 
claims. This means that the contestability period would only apply to the life cover even if 
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critical illness is attached to it. The implication on the insurance industry is that the insurers 
would have to end up separating all these policies.123 If the incontestability provision 
applies to a life policy and also to critical illness cover attached to the policy, the 
inconvenience to the insurance practice can be overcome.124 The incontestability 
provision is designed to protect the insured for long-term policies; there is no particular 
reason for the provision to be applied only to life policies. 
Accordingly, it is suggested that para.5 in Sch.1 to CIDRA could be amended as follows:  
"If the insurer would not have entered into the consumer insurance contract on any terms, 
the insurer may, within 5 years after the contract was entered into, avoid the contract and 
refuse all claims, but must return the premium paid." 
 Here the phrase "within 5 years after the contract was entered into" is added to limit the 
insurer’s right of avoidance within the period. 
Having considered the relevant rules in relation to incontestability provision in these 
common law and civil law jurisdictions, we now turn our attention to the Chinese law 
relating to incontestability provisions for the purposes of identifying deficiencies in the law 
and working out solutions to the problems. 
 
 Incontestability provisions in the Insurance Law and in insurance 
policies in China  
 
Statutory provisions 
The 1995 and 2002 versions of the Insurance Law entitled the insurer to reject a claim and 
rescind a contract on the ground of intentional or negligent non-disclosure *J.B.L. 271  or 
misrepresentation, but did not provide time-limits within which the insurer could exercise 
his right of rescission of the contract.125 As a result, the insurer often abused his right to 
reject claims and rescind the contract at any time by reason of non-disclosure or 
misrepresentation. This was very unfair to the insured, particularly in life insurance where 
the insured had paid premiums for many years, but could not get anything because of 
non-disclosure when the life insured died. In the 2009 version of the Insurance Law, the 
relevant rules relating to the insured’s duty of disclosure and the incontestability provision 
are provided in art.16 of the Law. For the convenience for later discussion of relevant rules 
relating to non-disclosure, misrepresentation and incontestability, the article is shown 
below:  
"Art.16(1): When concluding an insurance contract, the insurer may raise questions 
concerning relevant details of the insured subject matter or of the insured. The proposer 
shall truthfully disclose such details to the insurer. 
Art.16(2): The insurer shall have the right to rescind the insurance contract where the 
proposer fails to fulfil the obligation of truthful disclosure provided in the preceding 
paragraph intentionally or by gross negligence so that the failure of disclose or 
representation shall sufficiently influence the insurer’s decision on whether he will accept 
the insurance or raise the premium rate. 
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Art.16(3): The right of rescission provided in the preceding paragraph shall lapse where the 
insurer does not exercise it thirty days after he knows that there is the cause for rescission. 
Where over two years have passed from the date of formation of the contract, the insurer 
may not rescind the contract; where an insured event occurs, the insurer shall be liable for 
making indemnity payment or paying insurance benefits. 
Art.16(4): Where the proposer fails to perform his duty of disclosure and truthful 
representation of information to the insurer intentionally, the insurer shall not be liable for 
making indemnity payments or paying insurance benefits in connection with the insured 
events that occur prior to the rescission of the contract, and shall not refund the premium. 
Art.16(5): Where the failure of the proposer to perform his duty of disclosure and truthful 
representation by gross negligence has a material impact on the occurrence of the insured 
events, the insurer shall not be liable for making indemnity payments or paying insurance 
benefits in connection with the insured events that occur prior to the rescission of the 
contract, but he shall refund the premium." 
 By virtue of art.16, the insured is required to disclose material information at the time of 
applying for the insurance. The Law adopts the way of inquiring disclosure *J.B.L. 
272  (not voluntary disclosure).126 The insured is only obliged to disclose the information 
asked in questions by the insurer in the proposal form, and the insurer may not avoid a 
policy on the ground that the insured did not disclose something material which is beyond 
the questions raised in the proposal form.127 The Supreme People’s Court of China (SPC) 
has recently provided that the insured’s duty to disclose is confined to the scope and 
content of the insurer’s inquiry; where the insurer and the insured dispute on the scope and 
content of the inquiry, the onus of proof rests upon the insurer.128 The material 
information is such that sufficiently influences the insurer’s decision as to whether to 
accept the risk, and if so, on what terms.129 The insurer has right to rescind the contract 
where the insured breaches his duty of disclosure intentionally or by gross negligence and 
the undisclosed circumstances are material.130 For intentional non-disclosure, the insurer 
is free from liabilities for any loss that occurred before rescission of the contract whether or 
not the loss is caused by the undisclosed facts, and can retain the premium.131 For grossly 
negligent non-disclosure, the insurer is not liable for pre-rescission losses if the insured’s 
non-disclosure has a material impact on the occurrence of the insured events, but should 
refund the premium.132 These remedies relating to pre-rescission losses are available only 
where the insurer has exercised his right to rescind the contract within the contestability 
periods. Article 16(3) provides two contestability periods: (1) a 30-day period from the 
time the insurer becomes aware of the non-disclosure or misrepresentation; and (2) a 
two-year period from the time of the conclusion of the contract. After the time-limits lapse, 
the insurer is barred from contesting the validity of the contract on the ground of 
non-disclosure or misrepresentation. 
The Insurance Law 2009 also provides rules of law on misstatement of age of the insured. 
Article 32 states:  
"Where the age of the insured as declared by the proposer is not true and his true age fails 
to meet the age requirements set forth in the contract, the insurer may rescind the contract 
and in this case, he shall refund the cash value of the insurance policy according to the 
contract. Where the insurer exercises the right of rescission, the provisions in articles 16(3) 
and 16(6) of this Law shall be applicable. *J.B.L. 273  133 
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 The incontestability provision improves insured’s position in the insurance bargaining, but 
it is not free from difficulties. There are three major shortcomings with the provision. First, 
it is unclear whether or not the insurer should be barred from contesting the validity of the 
contract on the ground of fraud or fraudulent non-disclosure or misrepresentation after the 
expiration of the two-year contestability period. Secondly, the incontestability provision is 
ambiguous in the situation where the insured event occurs within the two-year 
contestability period, and the insured postpones filing a claim until the expiration of the 
two-year period. And thirdly, in the case of the reinstatement of suspended life policies, 
there is no answer to the question when the two-year period of contestability should 
commence to run; should it start to run from the time of formation of the original contract, 
or from the date of reinstatement of the suspended contract? These shortcomings and 
questions will be discussed shortly. 
 
Incontestability clause in insurance policies 
In accordance with the statutory requirements, insurers usually set forth incontestability 
clauses in life policies which are simply a restatement of art.16(3) and art.32(1) of the 
Insurance Law. For example, cl.8.2 of the life insurance policy of Ping An Insurance 
Company states:  
"Our right of rescission provided in the preceding paragraph shall lapse if we do not 
exercise it 30 days after we become aware of the cause of rescission. If over 2 years have 
passed from the date of conclusion of this contract, we shall not rescind the contract; 
where an insured event occurs, we shall be liable for paying insurance benefits." 
 Clause 8.3 of the same policy states:  
"Where the age of the life insured as declared by you is not true and his true age fails to 
meet the age requirements set forth in the contract, we have right to rescind the contract 
and in this case, we shall refund the cash value of the insurance policy. Where we exercise 
the right of rescission, clause 8.2 of this policy shall be applicable." 
 In the household property policy of Ping An Insurance Company, cl.18 states:  
"The right of rescission provided in the preceding paragraph shall lapse where the insurer 
does not exercise it in 30 days after he knows that there is the cause for rescission.134 
Where over 2 years have passed from the date of formation of the contract, the insurer 
may not rescind the contract; where an insured event occurs, the insurer shall be liable for 
making indemnity payment or paying insurance benefits." 
 This is exactly the same as art.16(3) of the Insurance Law. *J.B.L. 274   
 
Scope of application of the incontestability provision  
As the Insurance Law does not mention whether the incontestability provision applies to 
life insurance only or also applies to property insurance, this causes confusion. Some 
people135 have argued that the incontestability clause is not applicable to property 
insurance,136 while others have argued that incontestability is applicable to life insurance 
as well as to property insurance.137 It is submitted that the incontestability provision 
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should be applicable to both life and property insurance contracts for the following reasons. 
First, the incontestability provision is provided in the section of General Provisions in the 
Insurance Law,138 which implies that it is not limited to be applicable only to life insurance; 
it should be applied to property insurance as well. Secondly, the purpose of the 
incontestability clause is to prevent the insurer from abusing his right of rescission, so it 
should be applied to both life and property insurance contracts. Thirdly, although the 
standard form of contract for property insurance is usually for one year, if the contract is 
specially negotiated, it can be for more than two years.139 There is no particular reason to 
prevent the two-year incontestability clause from being applied to such a contract. Finally, 
the 30-day incontestability period should be applied to one-year term property insurance 
contracts.140 
It can be seen from the above-mentioned provisions in the Insurance Law and clauses in 
insurance policies that the incontestability provisions affect insurers’ right of rescission of 
the contract based only on the insureds’ non-disclosure or misrepresentation of material 
circumstances or misstatement of the age of the insured,141 not on any other defences. 
Incontestability should not apply to any policy for which the insured does not pay 
premiums as scheduled in the contract. The provisions and the policy clauses regarding 
incontestability do not entitle the insured to "free" insurance. If the insured does not keep 
on paying premiums, the policy becomes invalid. 
In addition, the concept of incontestability does not operate in the situation where there is 
lack of insurable interest. Where the insured does not have an insurable interest on the life 
insured, the contract is void ab initio.142 So the lack of an insurable interest does not 
become incontestable after the two-year contestability period expires because the evils of 
wagering in the guise of insurance *J.B.L. 275  and intentional destruction of the 
subject-matter of the insurance do not become less deviant at that time. The incontestable 
provision presupposes that the contract has been valid for a period of time. If the contract 
was void in the first instance because of lack of insurable interest, it could not be enforced 
by a court, even if there was an incontestable clause in the policy.143 Lack of an insurable 
interest makes the contract void,144 while breach of the duty of disclosure makes a 
contract voidable at the option of the insurer.145 Insurers may or may not exercise the 
right of rescission of the contract on the grounds of non-disclosure. If the insurer decides to 
rescind the contract, his right to do so is limited by two incontestability periods which are 
considered in detail below. 
 
 Two incontestability periods  
 
A 30-day contestability period from the time the insurer knows the cause 
for rescission 
The Insurance Law requires the insurer to exercise his right of rescinding the contract 
within 30 days after he becomes aware of the insured’s non-disclosure and 
misrepresentation. If he does not, he will lose his right to rescind the contract after the 
30-day period expires,146 and the contract then becomes incontestable. This is explained 
by the following case. 
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In Mr Zhang v Life Insurance Company,147 Mr Zhang effected a life policy on his father’s 
life and named himself as the beneficiary on 28 May 2008. His father was diagnosed with 
emphysema in a local hospital on 26 May 2008. He concealed this fact at the time of 
applying for the insurance. The life insured died on 6 January 2010. Mr Zhang claimed. 
Upon investigation, on 21 February 2010 the insurer discovered from the life insured’s 
medical record that the life insured had suffered from emphysema before the contract was 
entered into. The insurer therefore rejected the beneficiary’s claim on the ground of 
intentional non-disclosure and gave the rejection notice on 16 March 2010, but did not 
rescind the contract. The court held that according to art.16(3) of the Insurance Law, the 
insurer’s right of rescission of the contract shall lapse where the insurer does not exercise 
it within 30 days after he became aware of the cause for rescission. The date on which the 
insurer was deemed to know the cause of rescission was 21 February 2010, when the 
insurer learned from the life insured’s medical record that he had suffered from 
emphysema before the contract was entered into, so the insurer should have exercised the 
right of rescission within 30 days from 21 February 2010. The insurer failed to rescind the 
contract within the 30-day time-limit and therefore lost the right; thus he should be liable 
for paying out the insurance proceeds. *J.B.L. 276  148 
As mentioned earlier, the insurer’s remedies relating to pre-rescission losses are available 
only where the insurer has rescinded the contract within the contestability periods. If the 
insurer has lost his right to rescind the contract, these remedies are not available to 
him.149 In the case discussed above, the insurer would not have been liable for the 
insurance payments had he exercised his rights to rescind the contracts within 30 days 
after he became aware of the cause of rescission. 
In the situation where the insurer wants to reject a claim on the ground of intentional or 
grossly negligent non-disclosure, he must rescind the contract first unless the insurer and 
the insured have reached an agreement with regard to the claim settlement and the 
continuation of the contract. Chinese courts will not uphold any rejection of claims on the 
basis of non-disclosure or misrepresentation if the insurer has not rescinded the 
contract.150 In practice, it is rare that the insurer would find the insured’s non-disclosure 
or misrepresentation during the insurance period if the insured event does not occur. Even 
if the insurer becomes aware of the non-disclosure or misrepresentation prior to the 
occurrence of the insured event, the insurer usually would not actively seek a rescission of 
the contract for the purpose of receiving a premium. If the insurer were not to be barred by 
the 30-day time-limit for exercising his right of rescission after becoming aware of the 
intentional non-disclosure or misrepresentation, he would be able to collect the premium 
and then refuse to pay claims on the ground of intentional non-disclosure or 
misrepresentation before the two-year contestability period lapsed. Thus the insurer would 
be in a "nothing to lose but all to gain" position. 
It must be mentioned here that there is a limitation on the insurer’s exercising his right of 
rescinding the contract within 30 days after he knows the cause for rescission. If the 
insurer becomes aware of or should have known of the insured’s non-disclosure or 
misrepresentation, but still collects the premium, the courts will not uphold the insurer’s 
request for rescission of the contract on the ground of non-disclosure or misrepresentation, 
even within the 30-day period.151 In English law, the acceptance of a premium or the 
grant of an extension of cover after receiving knowledge of a non-disclosure is good 
evidence of the insurer’s waiver to avoid the contract.152 
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As mentioned earlier, the 1995 and 2002 versions of the Insurance Law did not provide 
time-limits for the insurers to exercise right of rescission of the contracts *J.B.L. 277  by 
reason of non-disclosure and misrepresentation.153 This is unfair to the insureds, as can 
be seen in the case of Mr Xu v Life Insurance Company.154 There Mr Xu effected a life 
policy to cover his wife’s life and severe diseases on 12 May 2006. The life insured was 
found to have haematuria and stayed at Weifang Hospital for treatment in July 2007. Mr Xu 
claimed for medical costs on 5 November 2007 but was rejected by the insurer on the 
ground that Weifang Hospital was not one of the named hospitals in the policy. The insurer 
continued to collect premium from Mr Xu annually. On 22 February 2010, the life insured 
went to Xiamen First Hospital for treatments of thyroid nodules and chronic renal failure 
syndrome. Mr Xu claimed for medical costs on 28 March 2010. The insurer’s investigation 
revealed that the life insured was diagnosed with primary nephrotic syndrome and stayed 
at hospital for treatment on 19 February 2002. After that, the life insured regularly visited 
the hospital for treatments. The insured concealed this fact at the time of the contract. On 
this basis, the insurer rejected the insured’s claim and rescinded the contract on 29 April 
2010. 
The court found that when Mr Xu made the first claim on 5 November 2007, he submitted 
to the insurer the life insured’s medical record, with other relevant evidence and 
information for the claim. The life insured’s medical history was shown in the medical 
record. The insurer either knew or should have known the fact from the medical record that 
the life insured suffered from primary nephrotic syndrome before the contract was entered 
into. The insurer was deemed to know the cause of rescinding the contract at the time 
when he refused Mr Xu’s first claim.155 Article 17(2) of the Insurance Law 2002 allowed 
the insurer to rescind the contract on the ground of intentional or negligent non-disclosure 
or misrepresentation, but did not provide a contestability period within which the insurer 
should exercise his right of rescission. Instead of rescinding the contract, the insurer 
continued to collect the premium. The 2009 version of the Insurance Law became effective 
on 1 October 2009; accordingly, the 30-day time-limit for the insurer to exercise his right 
of rescission as stipulated in art.16(3) of the Insurance Law 2009 should have started to 
run from 1 October 2009.156 In this case, the insurer rescinded the contract on 29 April 
2010, by which time the 30-day contestability period had lapsed. Consequently the 
insurer’s rescission was ineffective. On this reasoning the court held that the contract was 
valid and the insurer was thus liable for paying the insurance proceeds. 
 
A two-year contestability period from the inception of the contract 
The Insurance Law 2009 provides another contestability period—the insurer’s right to 
rescind the contract by reason of non-disclosure or misrepresentation must *J.B.L. 
278  be exercised within two years from the inception of the contract.157 During the 
two-year period, a potential defence must clear both the requirements of intentional or 
grossly negligent misrepresentation and of materiality in order to be effective. 
In another case,158 Mr Zhang effected a life policy on his own life, with the coverage of 
death and severe diseases in August 2000. Zhang paid a premium every year and was 
diagnosed with uraemia in June 2005. His claim for being diagnosed with uraemia was paid 
by the insurer after investigation of the claim. When Zhang died of uraemia on 13 
December 2006, the insurer successfully rejected the beneficiary’s claim on the ground of 
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intentional non-disclosure of the fact that Zhang suffered kidney disease before the 
contract was entered into. The 2002 version of the Insurance Law did not have the 
incontestability provision. The insurer was allowed to rescind the contract by reason of 
non-disclosure or misrepresentation at any time. In this case, the insurer should have 
discovered the insured’s non-disclosure in June 2005 when he investigated Zhang’s claim 
for being diagnosed with severe disease (uraemia) and rescinded the contract at that time. 
Instead, the insured continued to collect the premium and turned down the beneficiary’s 
claim for death payment when Zhang died. This is obviously unfair to the insured and the 
beneficiary. 
By contrast, in the following case, the insurer had no right to rescind the contract on the 
ground of non-disclosure and misrepresentation according to the 2009 version of the 
Insurance Law, although the court upheld the insurer’s rescission of the contract by using 
the exclusion clause in the policy. In Mr Li v Life Insurance Company,159 Mr Li took an early 
retirement in October 2010, because he suffered from emphysema and was unable to work. 
Mr Li effected a life insurance on his own life and named his son as the beneficiary. He gave 
a negative answer to the question about his medical history "whether you have ever had 
any disease" on the proposal form. He paid premiums and the policy became effective on 
10 April 2011. There was an exclusion clause in the policy which states: "The insurer is not 
liable for the insured event where there was any act of concealment or fraud by the 
proposer or the life insured". Mr Li died of primary pulmonary heart disease (heart disease 
caused by his lung problem) on 26 October 2013. The beneficiary’s claim was turned down 
by the insurer on the ground that the insured intentionally concealed the fact that he had 
emphysema at the time of the contract. According to art.16(4) of the Insurance Law, the 
insurer can rescind the contract and reject the claim. But the beneficiary argued that as the 
contract had been effective for more than two years, the contract became incontestable in 
accordance with art.16(3) of the Insurance Law. The court held that the insurer should 
have been barred from rescinding the contract because the contract became incontestable 
after the two-year period lapsed. However, in this case, the insurer explicitly excluded his 
liability in the presence of the insured’s concealment, so the insurer was not liable for the 
claim. 
It can be argued that where the exclusion clause is not in agreement with the statutory 
rules, the exclusion clause should be ineffective according to *J.B.L. 279  art.19 of the 
Insurance Law.160 In this case, the insured concealed the fact that he suffered from 
emphysema. His concealment is equivalent to intentional non-disclosure. According to 
art.16(3) of the Insurance Law, intentional non-disclosure becomes incontestable after the 
two-year contestability period expires. The insurer’s exclusion of the liability in the 
presence of the insured’s concealment should not be effective, because this exclusion 
exempts the insurer of the obligations that he should have borne according to law.161 If an 
exclusion clause is allowed for the insurer to exclude liability based on the insured’s 
concealment at the time of the contract, the insurer would be able to bypass the 
incontestability provision as stipulated in art.16(3) of the Insurance Law. By this reasoning, 
the court’s decision in the above case was incorrect. The insurer should be made liable 
notwithstanding the exclusion clause.162 
 
 Fraud versus fraudulent non-disclosure or misrepresentation  
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The major difficulty with the incontestability provision in art.16(3) of the Insurance Law is 
that it is unclear whether or not the insurer should be barred from contesting the validity of 
the contract on the ground of fraud or fraudulent non-disclosure or misrepresentation after 
the expiration of the two-year contestability period. This ambiguity has caused and will 
continue to cause disputes. 
In the literal meaning of art.16(3) of the Insurance Law, the insurer can rescind the 
contract for intentional and grossly negligent non-disclosure or misrepresentation, but 
must exercise this right within two years from the inception of the contract. If the insured 
had a disease but intentionally concealed the fact and gave a negative answer to the 
question raised by the insurer, the insured’s act can be called intentional non-disclosure or 
misrepresentation, which should be equivalent to fraudulent non-disclosure or 
misrepresentation. In English law, fraud is proven when it is shown that a false 
representation has been made (1) knowingly; (2) without belief in its truth; or (3) 
recklessly, careless whether it be true or false. To prevent a false statement from being 
fraudulent, there must always be an honest belief in its truth.163 If the insured knows that 
he has hepatitis, but gives a negative answer to the question "Have you had any disease in 
the last three years?", he has knowingly made a false representation. This false 
representation can be called fraudulent misrepresentation. If the analysis is correct that 
fraudulent non-disclosure or misrepresentation is equivalent to intentional non-disclosure 
or misrepresentation, then fraudulent non-disclosure or misrepresentation should be 
covered by art.16(3) and can become incontestable after two years from the inception of 
the contract. As we have seen from the cases discussed above, the non-disclosure or 
*J.B.L. 280  misrepresentation were all made intentionally (or fraudulently); if fraudulent 
non-disclosure or misrepresentation are not covered by art.16(3), the scope of the 
incontestability provision would be confined to grossly negligent non-disclosure or 
misrepresentation only. This would not be the intention of the legislation. So it is submitted 
that the insurer should be barred from contesting the validity of the contract on the ground 
of fraudulent non-disclosure or misrepresentation after the expiration of the two-year 
period. 
The next question to be considered is whether other kinds of fraud should be excepted from 
the incontestability provision. It is, however, not always easy to distinguish fraudulent 
misrepresentation from other kinds of fraud, but it is important and necessary to do so in 
order to find an answer to the question. Fraudulent misrepresentation is a type of passive 
act. The insured can answer the questions in the proposal form with either "yes" or "no". He 
can conceal the true fact and give a false one, but he does not actively seek to do anything 
else to deceive the insurer. In contrast, if the insured actively takes other steps to deceive 
the insurer, the insured’s act should be treated as fraud. For example, if the insured 
employs an imposter (who is in good health) to take the medical examination in the place 
of the sick insured, the insured’s act should be treated as fraud (not fraudulent 
misrepresentation), because the insured actively seeks to deceive the insurer for the 
purpose of obtaining the contract which he would otherwise not have been able to obtain. 
This can be illustrated by the case of Ms Shuai Ying v China Life Insurance Company 
Ltd.164 There Ms Ying effected a life policy in July 1998 and another life policy in March 
2000 on her mother’s life, and named herself as the beneficiary. A clause in the policy 
states that "Any person who is under 70 and healthy can be the person to be insured …". 
Her mother fell over at home and died of a stroke on 15 March 2003. The insurer paid Ms 
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Ying the full amount of the death proceeds (¥270,000).165 In July 2003, the insurer 
received a letter with the signatures of more than 10 local people, which said that the 
insured’s age was wrong and there was fraud in this case. The insurer’s investigation 
revealed that at the time of applying for the first life policy, the insured’s age was 77, well 
beyond the insurable age limit of the policy, but Ms Ying misrepresented the insured’s age 
to be 54. Ms Ying also managed to change her mother’s date of birth from 7 January 1921 
to 7 November 1944 in the Household Registration Book,166 and employed an imposter to 
take the medical examination in the place of her mother. Upon the death of her mother, 
she also changed her mother’s date of birth in her own relevant records. The major 
argument in this case is whether Ms Ying’s acts constitute a crime of insurance fraud. 
*J.B.L. 281   
According to art.138 of the Insurance Law 2002,167 if an insured deliberately fabricates 
the subject-matter of the insurance to defraud the insurer of insurance payments, then the 
insured commits a crime of insurance fraud. So the question whether Ms Ying committed a 
crime of insurance fraud becomes a question whether Ms Ying’s misrepresentation of the 
insured’s age should be regarded as "deliberately fabricat[ing] the subject matter of the 
insurance". Ms Ying argued that the subject-matter of the life policy is a person’s physical 
body and lifetime. In this case, the insured subject-matter is her mother’s death or life, but 
not her age. So her misrepresentation of her mother’s age should not be regarded as 
fabricating the insured subject-matter. Article 54 of the Insurance Law 2002 was 
concerned with remedies to the insurer for the misstatement of the life insured’s age; it 
stated that if the age of the life insured as declared by the proposer is untrue and the true 
age does not fall within the age limit specified in the contract, the insurer may rescind the 
contract and refund the premium to the proposer after deducting service charge. However, 
this does not apply to cases where the formation of the contract has been over two years 
ago. During the two-year period, if the insurer finds any untrue statement of the insured’s 
age, he has the right to rescind the contract. In this case, the insurer neither investigated 
the truth of the insured’s age nor rescinded the contract during the two-year period, so the 
insurer should be barred from rescinding the contract because the contract was more than 
two years from the time of formation of the contract. 
The insurer counter-argued that the life policy was supposed to cover a person who was 
born on 7 November 1944, but this person in fact did not exist. This insured person was a 
fabricated subject-matter of the insurance. The person who was born on 7 January 1921 
did exist, but should not be covered by the policy. Ms Ying changed her mother’s date of 
birth at the time of applying for the policy and changed her own relevant documents where 
her mother’s date of birth was recorded after her mother’s death. By virtue of art.138 of 
the Insurance Law 2002, if the insured intentionally fabricates the subject-matter of the 
insurance in order to defraud the insurer of insurance proceeds, his act constitutes 
insurance fraud. He should be investigated for his criminal responsibility in accordance with 
law. Ms Ying’s acts were intentional fraud for the purpose of securing the life policy which 
would otherwise not have been obtained without the misstatement of her mother’s age. 
The court held: (1) the misstatement of the age of the insured is not *J.B.L. 
282  "fabricating the subject matter of insurance" and should not be treated as a crime of 
insurance fraud; (2) art.54 of the Insurance Law 2002 should apply to this case. The 
insurer did not contest the validity of the contract during the two-year period, so it was 
barred from rescinding the contract based on misrepresentation after the two-year period 
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has lapsed. The insurer appealed to the High Court of the Yunnan Province. The High Court 
did not make a decision and reported the case to the Supreme People’s Court. The case has 
yet to be decided by the SPC. 
There has been no final decision in this case as to whether or not Ms Ying’s misstatement 
of her mother’s age constitutes a fraud. It may be argued that substitution of a healthy 
person (the imposter) to take a medical examination for her sick mother should be treated 
as a fraud, and contest should be allowed even though the fraud was successfully 
concealed for more than two years. Such kinds of cases might be handled on the theory 
that there was no policy at all in the first place. 
As mentioned earlier, English, Australian and New Zealand law do not tolerate fraud.168 
The insurer is not barred from contesting the validity of the contract on the ground of fraud 
or fraudulent non-disclosure or misrepresentation after the contestability period expires. 
The approaches to fraud or fraudulent misrepresentation vary from one state to the next in 
the US. Fraudulent misrepresentation is excepted from the applicability of the 
incontestable clause in a few states.169 Sometimes courts allow a fraud defence 
notwithstanding an incontestability clause if the insured’s fraud at the time of applying for 
insurance is so profound that public policy would be disserved by enforcing the policy.170 
Similarly, in some states, if a person applies for insurance through the use of an imposter, 
the incontestability clause will not bar the insurer from contesting coverage.171 But, in 
some other states,172 the incontestability clause bars insurer’s impostor defence.173 
German law provides two contestability periods: five years for unintentional non-disclosure, 
and 10 years for intentional or fraudulent non-disclosure.174 
Having considered approaches relating to the applicability of the incontestability provision 
in the case of fraud or fraudulent non-disclosure or misrepresentation in China and in other 
jurisdictions, it is now appropriate to make suggested answers to the question whether the 
insurer should be barred from contesting the validity of the contract on the basis of fraud or 
fraudulent non-disclosure or misrepresentation after the expiration of the two-year 
contestability period as provided in art.16(3) of the Insurance Law. *J.B.L. 283   
It is suggested that the insurer should not be allowed to contest the validity of the contract 
on the ground of fraudulent non-disclosure or misrepresentation after the two-year 
contestability period expires; and that for profound fraud, such as the use of an imposter, 
the incontestability clause should not bar the insurer from contesting the validity of the 
contract after the two-year contestability period expires. Accordingly art.16(3) of the 
Insurance Law should be amended as follows: "Where over two years have passed from the 
date of formation of the contract, the insurer may not rescind the contract, except in the 
presence of fraud …".175 Here the phrase "except in the presence of fraud" is added. By 
this amendment, profound fraud (such as the use of an impostor) is excluded from the 
scope of application of the incontestability provision. 
 
 The insured event occurred during the two-year contestability period but 
the claim is made after expiration of the period  
Article 16(3) of the Insurance Law provides:  
"Where the proposer fails to fulfil the obligation of truthful disclosure … Where over two 
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years have passed from the date of formation of the contract, the insurer may not rescind 
the contract; where an insured event occurs, the insurer shall be liable for making 
indemnity payment or paying insurance benefits." 
 This provision does not make it clear whether or not the insurer shall be liable for the 
insured event which occurred within the two-year period but the claim is made after 
expiration of the period. The ambiguity of the provision has caused lots of disputes. It 
happens in practice that where the insured event occurred during the contestability period, 
the insured or beneficiaries deliberately postpone filing a claim until the expiration of the 
two-year contestability period in order to avoid the insurer’s rescission of the contract on 
the ground of non-disclosure and secure the protection of the incontestability. For example, 
in Mr Wang v Life Insurance Company,176 Mr Wang effected a severe disease insurance 
policy on 7 April 2009. Under the policy the insurer promised to pay ¥50,000 if the insured 
was diagnosed with a severe disease (such as cancer, heart attack, etc.). At the time of 
applying for the insurance contract the insured gave a negative answer to the question in 
the proposal form "Have you ever had any disease or received treatments for any disease?" 
The insured in fact had suffered a chronic kidney disease for years but concealed this fact. 
The insured was diagnosed with uraemia on 25 Oct 2010, and made a claim on 10 October 
2011, by which time the two-year contestability period was expired. The insurer rescinded 
the contract and rejected the claim on the ground of intentional misrepresentation. The 
court held that the insurer was barred from rescinding the contract by the incontestability 
provision of the Insurance Law and thus liable for the claim. *J.B.L. 284  177 
In this case, the insured successfully bypassed the two-year contestability period and 
avoided the insurer’s rescission of the contract. The ambiguity of the law in this respect 
would certainly encourage the insured to intentionally avoid contestability of the contract 
by waiting until the two-year contestability period has expired before filing a claim for the 
insured event which occurred during the two-year contestability period. The law is thus in 
need of improvement. 
The approach on this point in the US can be referred to here. In order to avoid this situation, 
in the US, most incontestability clauses are limited by a provision stating that the 
contestability period must be completed "during the lifetime of the insured".178 With this 
nuance the insurer is able to contest a claim for insurance benefits after the contestability 
period has lapsed if the insured dies before the end of that period. The "during the lifetime 
of the insured" requirement suggests that the insured must live through the contestability 
period for the contract to become incontestable. If the insured dies immediately prior to the 
expiration of the contestability period, the two-year contestability period passes, and the 
insurer then announces that it is refusing to pay proceeds because of the insured’s 
misrepresentation, the incontestability clause does not operate to cause the insurer to lose 
the misrepresentation defence.179 In some situations, however, the insured’s death does 
not interrupt the running of the two-year period if the policies do not include the phrase of 
"during the lifetime of the insured" in the incontestability clause. Under this line of 
authority, the insurer who takes action after expiration of the contestability period to 
contest coverage in a situation where the insured did not survive through the contestability 
period is barred by the incontestability clause from denying coverage.180 
In order to avoid disputes arising from the ambiguity of the art.16(3) of the Insurance Law 
and prevent the insured from taking advantage of the loophole of the provision, the law 
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should make it clear that the insurer is barred from contesting the contract only for the 
insured event which occurs after the two-year anniversary of the formation of the contract 
passes. Accordingly, art.16(3) of the Insurance Law should be amended as follows:  
"Where over two years have passed from the date of formation of the contract, the insurer 
may not rescind the contract; where an insured event occurs after such a two-year period, 
the insurer shall be liable for making indemnity payment or paying insurance benefits." 
 Here the phrase "after such a two-year period" is added to define the scope of period 
during which the insured event occurs. As discussed earlier, the *J.B.L. 
285  incontestability provision should also be applicable to property insurance contracts, 
so it seems not appropriate to add the phrase "during the lifetime of the insured" into 
art.16(3). Instead, it would be appropriate for the insurers to add this phrase into the 
contestability clause in life policies. 
 
 Incontestability for reinstated contracts  
It is not difficult to determine the time point when the two-year contestability starts to run, 
as the Insurance Law clearly sets out that the time starts to run from the date of conclusion 
of the contract.181 The Insurance Law allows a suspended life contract to be reinstated; it 
is submitted that the incontestability provision should also apply to an application for 
reinstatement of lapsed coverage. The question to be considered here is when the two-year 
contestability period should commence to run. Should it start to run from the time of 
formation of the original contract, or from the date of reinstatement of the suspended 
contract? There is no apparent answer to this question in the Insurance Law. 
The rules for reinstatement of a suspended contract are stipulated in art.37 of the 
Insurance Law, which provides:  
"A contract which lapses in accordance with art.36 of this Law182 is reinstated where the 
insurer and the proposer have reached an agreement through consultations and the 
proposer has paid the outstanding premiums. However, the insurer has the right of 
rescission where no agreement has been reached by the parties within two years from the 
date of the lapse of the contract." 
 According to this article, the insured can apply for a reinstatement and the application 
must be agreed by the insurer. The insurer needs to check if the suspended contract meets 
the requirements of the reinstatement. 
It is unclear whether or not the insured has a statutory duty to disclose material fact to the 
insurer at the time of reinstatement of the contract, as the Insurance Law does not give any 
stipulation in this regard. In practice, however, the insurer usually requires the insured to 
disclose new information about the reinstatement. The insurer can either agree to reinstate 
the contract or to reject the application for reinstatement based on the information 
supplied by the insured. 
It is reasonable for the insurer to request the insured to disclose new information relating 
to the reinstatement of the contract, because it is often the case that after the contract is 
suspended, the insured has found the life insured to have a disease and then wishes to 
reinstate the suspended contract. This is called adverse selection. If an adverse selection is 
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not limited, it would not be fair to the insurer. On the other hand, the insurer should not be 
allowed to refuse an application for reinstatement on the ground of a disease which 
developed or was diagnosed prior to the suspension of the contract. *J.B.L. 286   
In practice, the insurers usually ask questions in the application form for reinstatement. In 
Mr Zhang v Life Insurance Company,183 a question on the reinstatement application form 
asks: "From the date of formation of the original contract to this date, do you have any 
physical symptoms or signs which are newly found or were found before the contract was 
entered into." If the insurer is allowed to ask such a question and then refuses the 
application for reinstatement based on the information from the answer to the question, 
this would be equivalent to giving the insurer the second opportunity to turn down the 
contract (particularly in the case of a bad bargain) which the insurer would otherwise not 
have been able to reject if the contract had not been suspended. 
It is submitted that the insured should be allowed to ask a question such as "From the 
beginning of suspension of the original contract to this date, do you have any physical 
symptoms or signs or diseases?"184 And then the insurer can decide to accept or reject the 
application for reinstatement on the basis of the answer to this question. It is appropriate 
for the insurer to have an adequate window of time to investigate the new information 
relating to the reinstatement. It is suggested that a two-year period of time should be 
adequate from the date of the reinstatement,185 so the two-year contestability period 
should also apply to reinstatement and run from the date of the reinstatement. 
If the reinstatement occurs within two years from the time of formation of the original 
contract, information supplied by the insured at the time of the original contract and that at 
the time of reinstatement can all be invoked by the insurer to contest the contract. But if 
the reinstatement occurs after two years from the formation of the original contract, only 
the new information can be used by the insurer to contest the reinstated contract and the 
contest should be barred after two years from the date of reinstatement of the contract. 
It is the settled law in the US that before a lapsed policy is reinstated, the insured is almost 
always required to present new evidence of insurability.186 If the policy is reinstated owing 
to the insured’s fraud or misrepresentation, most courts hold that with respect to the new 
evidence presented the contestability period runs again from the date of the 
reinstatement.187 Defences based on facts relevant to the initial issuance of the policy and 
that were barred by the running of the first contestability period remain barred.188 
As mentioned earlier, the Insurance Law requires the insurer to exercise his right of 
rescinding the contract within 30 days after he knows the cause for rescission. If he does 
not, his right of rescission will be extinguished after 30 days. *J.B.L. 287  Logically, the 
30-day limitation should also be applied to a reinstated contract. If the insurer is allowed to 
rescind the contract by reason of the insured’s non-disclosure of new material information 
at the time of applying for the reinstatement, his right to rescind the contract should also 
be exercised within 30 days after he becomes aware of the new cause for rescission. 
 
 Conclusions and suggestions  
This article has examined the incontestability provision in the insurance law and policies in 
some common law and civil law jurisdictions. 
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The CIDRA does not include an incontestability provision. This is out of line with approaches 
in many other jurisdictions. The insurer is entitled to avoid the contract at any time by 
reason of careless misrepresentation where the insurer would not have entered into the 
contract on any terms. It is suggested that an incontestability provision be introduced to 
CIDRA in its amendment in the future. Paragraph 5 in Sch.1 to the CIDRA could be 
amended as follows:  
"If the insurer would not have entered into the consumer insurance contract on any terms, 
the insurer may, within 5 years after the contract was entered into, avoid the contract and 
refuse all claims, but must return the premium paid." 
 In Chinese law, three major shortcomings with the incontestability provision have been 
identified and critically discussed. The ambiguity of the provision has been clarified as to 
the question whether the insurer should be barred from contesting the validity of the 
contract on the ground of fraud or fraudulent non-disclosure or misrepresentation after the 
expiration of the two-year period. It is suggested that the incontestability provision should 
be applicable to fraudulent non-disclosure or misrepresentation, but not to other kinds of 
fraud. For profound fraud, such as the use of an imposter, the insurer should be allowed to 
contest the validity of the contract after the two-year period expires. 
The incontestability provision is ambiguous where the insured event occurs within the 
two-year period, the insured postpones filing a claim until the expiration of the two-year 
period. It is suggested that in the case of intentional or grossly negligent non-disclosure or 
misrepresentation, the insurer should be liable only for the event which occurs after the 
two-year period expires. 
It is suggested that the incontestability provision should be applied to reinstatement of 
suspended life policies; and that with respect to the new information presented at the time 
of applying for reinstatement, the two-year contestability period should run again from the 
date of the reinstatement. 
It is recommended that art.16(3) of the Insurance Law be amended as follows:  
"Where over two years have passed from the date of formation of the contract, the insurer 
may not rescind the contract, except in the presence of fraud; where an insured event 
occurs after such a two-year period, the insurer shall be liable for making indemnity 
payment or paying insurance benefits." 
 Here the phrase "except in the presence of fraud" is added to exclude fraud from the scope 
of application of the incontestability provision. The phrase "after such *J.B.L. 288  a 
two-year period" is added to define the scope of period during which the insured event 
occurs. 
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39. Law Commissions, Insurance Contract Law: A Joint Consultation Paper (June 2007), paras 4.203 and 
4.204. 
40. See Law Commissions, Consumer Insurance Law (December 2009), para.10.23. 
41. Law Commissions, Consumer Insurance Law (December 2009), paras 4.52 to 4.53 and paras 10.20 to 
10.28. 
42. See Law Commissions, Insurance Contract Law: Issues Paper 1 (September 2006). 
43. Non-consumer insurance contract means a contract of insurance that is not a consumer insurance contract. 
This includes insurance for charities, micro-businesses and small or medium enterprises, as well as large 
risks, marine insurance and reinsurance. 
44. Insurance Act 2015 s.3. 
45. Insurance Act 2015 s.8. 
46. Insurance Act 2015 Schedule, Pt 1, paras 2 –4. 
47. Such as Australia, New Zealand, Canada, China, Germany and the US. 
48. For an overview of life insurance on misrepresentation and non-disclosure in Australia, see R. Merkin, 
Reforming insurance law: is there a case for reverse transportation?, Report for the English and Scottish 
Law Commissions on the Australian experience of insurance law reform (2007), paras 4.58 to 4.62; and 
also G. Boyd, "The Duty of Disclosure in Life Insurance: is the Balance struck by Part IV of the Insurance 
Contracts Act Appropriate?" (2001) 13 Ins. L.J. 59. 
49. Life Insurance Act 1945 s.84 provides: "A policy shall not be avoided by reason only of any incorrect 
statement (other than a statement as to the age of the life insured) made in any proposal or other 
document on the faith of which the policy was issued or reinstated by the company unless the statement —  
 
(a)was fraudulently untrue; or 
 
(b)being a statement material in relation to the risk of the company under the policy, was 
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made within the period of three years immediately preceding the date on which the policy 
is sought to be avoided or the date of the death of the life insured, whichever is the 
earlier." 
 
 
50. For more, see Merkin, Reforming insurance law (2007), para.4.58. 
51. ICA s.29(1). 
52. ICA s.29(2). The insurer must initially prove that he would not have entered into the contract on any term 
but for misrepresentation or non-disclosure, i.e. that he was induced by the presentation of the risk. This 
is so even if there is fraud (Schaffer v Royal & Sun Alliance Life Assurance Australia Ltd [2003] QCA 182). 
If the inducement requirement is satisfied, the insurer has the right of avoidance for fraud, although this 
subject to the court’s power to disapply the remedy of avoidance under s.31 of the ICA. 
53. The ICA does not define fraudulent non-disclosure or fraudulent misrepresentation. Accordingly, its 
meaning is derived from the common law. Non-disclosure of a material fact is fraudulent if the insured 
knew the fact and deliberately concealed it because they believed the insurer might decline the risk or only 
accept it on special terms if they disclosed the fact (Dalgety Co Ltd v Australian Mutual Provident Society 
[1908] V.L.R. 481 at 499). Misrepresentation of a material fact is fraudulent if the insured made it: without 
actually and honestly believing it was true, or recklessly indifferent to whether it was true or not (NTG 
Victory Australia Ltd v Hudson [2003] WASCA 291 at [5] (Steytler J), [32] (Parker J), citing Sutton, 
Insurance Law in Australia, 3rd edn (LBS, 1999), para.3.138); and with the intention of it being acted on 
(Dr Gregory Moore v National Mutual Life Association of Australasia Ltd [2011] NSWSC 416 at [71]). For 
more, see G. Pynt, Australian Insurance Law: A First Reference, 2nd edn (LexisNexis Butterworths, 2011), 
para.8.25. 
54. ICA s.29(3). 
55. ICA s.29(4). There are also other remedies as provided at s.29(5) to 29(10) of the ICA. 
56. Mccabe v Royal & Sun Alliance Life Assurance Australia Ltd [2003] WASCA 162. 
57. Schaffer v Royal & Sun Alliance Life Assurance Australia Ltd [2003] QCA 182. 
58. ICA s.28(2). 
59. ICA s.28(3). For example, if the insurer would (1) have charged a higher premium if there had been proper 
disclosure and no misrepresentation, the insurer’s liability will be reduced by the amount of the notional 
increase in premium; (2) have inserted a different term into the contract if there had been proper 
disclosure and no misrepresentation, the insurer will only be liable to the extent that it would have been if 
the term had been inserted. If the term would have excluded liability for the claim, the insurer’s liability will 
be reduced to nil; or (3) not have entered into the contract at all if there had been proper disclosure and no 
misrepresentation, the insurer’s liability will be reduced to nil, although it will be required to return the 
premium (unless the non-disclosure or misrepresentation was fraudulent). For more, see Pynt, Australian 
Insurance Law (2011), para.8.54. 
60. ICA s.30. 
61. CIDRA Sch.1, para.5. 
62. For an overview of the legislations on non-disclosure and misrepresentation in New Zealand, see Merkin, 
Reforming insurance law (2007), paras 4.63 to 4.67. 
63. New Zealand Law Commission, Preliminary Paper 53, Life Insurance (December 2003), paras 5.1 to 5.3, 
http://www.lawcom.govt.nz/sites/default/files/mediaReleaseAttachments/Publication_90_271_PR%20LI
F.pdf [Accessed 24 March 2016. 
64. Insurance Law Reform Act 1977 s.6:  
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"Incorrectness and materiality defined:  
 
(1)For the purposes of sections 4 and 5, and notwithstanding any admission, term, 
condition, stipulation, warranty, or proviso in the application or proposal for insurance or 
in the life policy or contract of insurance, a statement is substantially incorrect only if the 
difference between what is stated and what is actually correct would have been 
considered material by a prudent insurer. 
 
(2)For the purposes of sections 4 and 5, and notwithstanding any admission, term, 
condition, stipulation, warranty, or proviso in the application or proposal for insurance or 
in the life policy or contract of insurance, a statement is material only if that statement 
would have influenced the judgment of a prudent insurer in fixing the premium or in 
determining whether he would have taken or continued the risk upon substantially the 
same terms." 
 
 
65. Insurance Law Reform Act 1977 s.6. 
66. A statement is made fraudulently if the person making it makes it knowing it is incorrect, or without belief 
in its correctness, or recklessly without caring whether it is correct or not (s.4(2) of the Insurance Law 
Reform Act 1977). 
67. Insurance Law Reform Act 1977 s.4:  
"Misstatements in contracts of life insurance:  
 
(1)A life policy shall not be avoided by reason only of any statement (other than a 
statement as to the age of the life insured) made in any proposal or other document on 
the faith of which the policy was issued, reinstated, or renewed by the company unless 
the statement—  
 (a) was substantially incorrect; and 
 
 (b) was material; and 
 
 (c) was made either—  
 (i) fraudulently; or 
 
 (ii) within the period of 3 years immediately preceding the date on which the 
policy is sought to be avoided or the date of the death of the life insured, 
whichever is the earlier. 
 
(2)For the purposes of subparagraph (i) of paragraph (c) of subsection (1), a statement 
is made fraudulently if the person making it makes it—  
 (a) knowing it is incorrect; or 
 
 (b) without belief in its correctness; or 
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 (c) recklessly, without caring whether it is correct or not." 
 
 
68. Insurance Law Reform Act 1977 s.7. 
69. New Zealand Law Commission, Some Insurance Law Problems (Report 46, May 1998). 
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interim cover or on the reinstatement or renewal of a policy (New Zealand Law Commission, Some 
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74. New Zealand Law Commission, Life Insurance (November 2004). 
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78. New Zealand Ministry of Economic Development (NZMED), Review of Financial Products and Providers: 
Insurance (December 2006), para.283. 
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between what is stated or failed to be disclosed and what is actually correct would have influenced the 
judgment of a prudent insurer in fixing the premium or in determining whether the prudent insurer would 
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80. A question was asked in NZMED, Review of Financial Products and Providers (December 2006) for 
consultation (question 35): should the interim cover circumstance giving the right to avoid be limited to 10 
days or a longer period? 
81. These remedies will apply where (1) the insurer is not entitled to avoid the contract, and in the 
circumstances a reasonable person ought to have known that the undisclosed or misrepresented fact would 
have influenced the judgment of a prudent insurer in relation to that insurance contract; or (2) for life 
insurance, an incorrect statement of the age of the insured (NZMED, Review of Financial Products and 
Providers (December 2006), para.292). The restitution remedies that will apply to the insurer are: (1) 
declining to accept the risk on any terms (i.e. exclude a particular risk prospectively, or cancel the policy 
prospectively); (2) accepting the risk only at a higher premium; (3) accepting the risk on different terms 
regardless of the premium; and (4) for life insurance age misstatement, the formula in cl.13 of the 
Insurance Contracts Bill 2004 will apply. 
82. L. Dalziel, Insurance: Contracts, Agency and Assignment (n.d.), Ministry of Business, Innovation and 
Employment. 
http://www.med.govt.nz/business/business-law/pdf-docs-library/past-work-and-older-topics-pdfs/revie
w-of-financial-products/insurance-contracts-agency-and-assignments.pdf/view [Accessed August 2014]. 
83. Insurance Law Reform Act 1977 s.7. 
84. Stalson, Marketing Life Insurance (1942), p.317. See also Salzman, "The Incontestable Clause in Life 
Insurance Policies" [1969] Ins. L.J. 142, 142. 
85. Of the 50 states, 43 states have statutes setting out mandatory incontestable clauses in life insurance 
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contracts: see Salzman, "The Incontestable Clause in Life Insurance Policies" [1969] Ins. L.J. 142, 143. 
86. See R. Jerry and D. Richmond, Understanding Insurance Law, 5th edn (LexisNexis, 2012), p.763. 
87. See, e.g., Ala. Code §27-19-5 (2001); N.J. Stat. Ann. §17B: 26-5a (2010); Tex. Code Ann. §705.104 
(2005). 
88. Paul Revere Life Insurance Co v Gilbert K. Haas 644 A. 2d 1098 (N.J. 1994). 
89. N.J. Stat. Ann. §17B: 26-5 (2010). 
90. N.J. Stat. Ann. §17B: 26-5 (2010). 
91. See Jerry and Richmond, Understanding Insurance Law (2012), p.769. 
92. See Obtartuch v Sect. Mut. Life Ins. Co 114 F. 2d 873 (7th Cir. 1940); Strawbridge v N.Y. Life Ins. Co 504 
F. Supp. 824 (D.N.J. 1980); Muslin v Columbian Nat’l Life Ins. Co 3 F. Supp. 368 (S.D.N.Y. 1932). 
93. Such as Florida, California, etc. 
94. See Allstate life Ins. Co v Miller 424 F. 3d 1113 (11th Cir. 2005); Amex Life Assurance Co v Superior Court 
14 Cal. 4th 1231 [60 Cal. Rptr 2d 898, 930 P. 2d 1264 (1997). 
95. Amex Life Assurance Co v Superior Court 14 Cal. 4th 1231 [60 Cal. Rptr 2d 898, 930 P. 2d 1264] (1997). 
96. California Insurance Code 2010 §10113.59(b)(2)(B) defines an impostor as "a person other than the 
named insured who participates in any manner in the application process for a certificate under an 
individual life insurance policy and represents himself or herself to be the named insured or represents that 
a sample or specimen of blood, urine, or other bodily substance is that of the named insured". 
97. Cal. Ins. Code §10113.5(b) provides: "Notwithstanding subdivision (a), if photographic identification is 
presented during the application process, and if an impostor is substituted for a named insured in any part 
of the application process, with or without the knowledge of the named insured, then no contract between 
the insurer and the named insured is formed, and any purported insurance contract is void from its 
inception." 
98. Insurance Contract Act 2008 s.19(2) and (3). In the event of withdrawal after the occurrence of the insured 
event, the insurer shall not be obligated to effect payment, unless the breach of the duty of disclosure 
refers to a circumstance which is neither responsible for the occurrence or for the establishment of the 
occurrence of the insured event nor for the establishment or the extent of the insurer’s liability. If the 
policyholder has fraudulently breached the duty of disclosure, the insurer shall not be obligated to effect 
payment (Insurance Contract Act 2008 s.21(2)). 
99. Insurance Contract Act 2008 s.19(3). It is implied that the insurer should be liable for the insured event 
which occurred prior to the termination of the contract. 
100. Insurance Contract Act 2008 s.21(1). 
101. Insurance Contract Act 2008 s.19(4). 
102. According to art.5 and art.8 of the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the 
People’s Republic of China 1990, the socialist system and policies shall not be practised in the Hong Kong 
and the previous capitalist system (including the common law, rules of equity and so on) and way of life 
shall remain unchanged for 50 year from 1 July 1997. 
103. See Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance in Hong Kong, 2nd edn, edited by R. Merkin (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 
2012), para.1.011. 
104. Marine Insurance Ordinance s.18(1). For more on non-disclosure and misrepresentation in Hong Kong, see 
Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance in Hong Kong (2012), paras 6.001 to 6.140. 
105. Marine Insurance Ordinance s.20(1). 
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106. For example, art.24 of the Code provides: "An insurer should not refuse a claim by a policyholder: (a) on 
the grounds of nondisclosure of a material fact which the policyholder could not reasonably have been 
expected to disclose, or if the insurance was issued without the policyholder being requested to submit a 
proposal; (b) on the grounds of misrepresentation unless this is a deliberate or negligent 
misrepresentation of a material fact, provided that this does not apply to marine or aviation policies; or (3) 
in the absence of fraud by the policyholder, on the grounds of a breach of warranty or condition if the loss 
is unrelated to the breach." The Code of Conduct for Hong Kong Insurers published by the Hong Kong 
Federation of Insurers is specifically required under s.67 of the Insurance Companies Ordinance (Cap. 41) 
(the full text of the Code can be seen at the website of the Office of the Commissioner of Insurance, 
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well-balanced provisions with a high degree of certainty will promote the insurance industry in Hong Kong 
which, in turn, will strengthen the position of this city as an international financial centre in the region. See 
P. Sooksripaisarnkit, "Insurance Contract Law: Should there be Reform in Hong Kong" (11 October 2011), 
Hong Kong Legal Community, LexisNexis, 
http://law.lexisnexis.com/webcenters/hk/Hong-Kong-Lawyer-/Insurance-contract-law-should-there-be-r
eform-in-Hong-Kong [Accessed 22 March 2016]. 
108. See Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance in Hong Kong (2012), paras 6.083 and 16.037. 
109. Wood v Dwarris (1856) 11 Ex.493; Wheelton v Hardisty (1858) 8 El. & Bl. 232. 
110. Anstey v British Natural Premium Life (1908) 99 L. R. 765. 
111. Re General provincial Ex p. Daintree (1870) 18 W.R. 396. 
112. Approved by Decree-Law No.40/99/M, of 3 August 1999; First amendment: Law No. 6/2000 of 27 April 
2000; Second amendment: Law No.16/2009 of 10 August 10 2009. Part 18 of the Commercial Code 
concerns insurance contracts. 
113. Commercial Code art.973. 
114. The term "bad faith" is not defined in the Code. It is translated from the term "e yi" in the Chinese version 
of the Commercial Code. It means here intentional or fraudulent, or with ill will. 
115. Commercial Code art.974. 
116. Commercial Code art.975. 
117. Commercial Code art.1041. 
118. It was first enacted on 30 December 1929 and amended many times in later years. The latest amendment 
was made on 8 January 2014. 
119. See Salzman, "The Incontestable Clause in Life Insurance Policies" [1969] Ins. L.J. 142, 162. 
120. N. Kirwan, "No test" (16 November 2006), Money Marketing, 
http://www.moneymarketing.co.uk/no-contest/132389.article [Accessed 22 March 2016]. 
121. See the Law Commissions, Consumer Insurance Law (December 2009), para.10.22. 
122. Law Commissions, Insurance Contract Law: A Joint Consultation Paper (June 2007), para.4.203. 
123. J. Gornitzki, "Non-contestability Proposal could Prove to be Harmful" (1 August 2007), Cover, 
http://www.covermagazine.co.uk/cover/news/2149042/non-contestability-proposal-prove-harmful 
[Accessed 22 March 2016]. 
124. The incontestability provision applies to life policy with severe disease cover in Chinese insurance practice. 
This will be seen later. 
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125. The 1995 and 2002 versions of Insurance Law did provide incontestability on misstatement of the life 
insured’s age after two years have lapsed from the date of conclusion of the contract. Article 53 of the 1995 
version and art.54 of the 2002 version are exactly the same; both provide: "Where the age of the insured 
as declared by the proposer is not true and his true age fails to meet the age requirements set forth in the 
contract, the insurer may rescind the contract and in this case, he shall refund the premium to the proposer 
after deducting a service charge, except that over two years have lapsed from the date of conclusion of the 
contract. 
Where the age declared by the insured is not true so that the proposer pays a premium less than the 
premium payable, the insurer shall have the right to adjust the premium and demand the proposer to make 
up the premium, or pay insurance monies in accordance with the proportion of the premium actually paid 
to the premium payable at the time of paying such insurance monies. 
Where the age declared by the insured is untrue so that the proposer has actually paid a premium more 
than the premium payable, the insurer shall return the exceeding premium received to the proposer." 
 
126. Insurance Law 2009 art.16(1). 
127. Jing, "Insured’s Duty of Disclosure and Test of Materiality in Marine and Non-marine Insurance Laws in 
China" [2006] J.B.L. 681, 688. 
128. Article 6 of the Supreme People’s Court Second Interpretation on Certain Questions Concerning the 
Application of the Insurance Law of the Peoples’ Republic of China, which was passed by the Judgement 
Committee of the Supreme People’s Court on 6 May 2013 and became effective on 8 June 2013 (SPC 
Interpretation (2)). According to arts 5 and 6 of the Stipulation of the Supreme People’s Court on the 
Judicial Explanation (2007 No.12), the Supreme People’s Court stipulation, judicial explanation or decision 
have legal effect. This means that the Supreme People’s Court stipulation, judicial explanation or decision 
is one of the legal sources in China. 
129. Insurance Law art.16(1). For test of materiality and remedies for breach of such duty of disclosure, see 
Jing, "Insured’s duty of disclosure and test of materiality in marine and non-marine insurance laws in 
China" [2006] J.B.L.681; and H.Y. Yeo, "Of Remedies and Non-disclosure in the Insurance Law of the 
People’s Republic of China" [2011] J.B.L. 556. 
130. Insurance Law art.16(1) and (2). 
131. Insurance Law 2009 art.16(4). 
132. Insurance Law 2009 art.16(5). It is implied that for an innocent or mere negligent non-disclosure, the 
insurer is not entitled to rescind the contract even if the facts undisclosed are material. Logically, the 
insurer should be liable for any loss even if the non-disclosure has a material impact on the occurrence of 
the insured event. 
133. Insurance Law 2009 art.32 continues: "Where the age declared by the insured is not true so that the 
proposer pays a premium less than the premium payable, the insurer shall have the right to adjust the 
premium and demand the proposer to make up the premium, or pay insurance monies in accordance with 
the proportion of the premium actually paid to the premium payable at the time of paying such insurance 
monies. 
Where the age declared by the insured is untrue so that the proposer has actually paid a premium more 
than the premium payable, the insurer shall return the exceeding premium received to the proposer."" 
 
134. It should be noted that "the cause of rescission" refers only to rescission caused by non-disclosure and 
misrepresentation. 
135. R.H. Zhang, "Application of Incontestability Clause" (18 December 2013), China Insurance Newspaper, 
http://fl.sinoins.com/2013-12/18/content_82861.htm [Accessed 22 March 2016]. 
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136. For a number of reasons: first, property insurance is usually for one year, while the incontestability clause 
is to protect the insured’s longer-term (two years or more) expectation. Secondly, the insured in property 
insurance is usually alive, so he is able to show evidence more easily than the insured in life insurance who 
has died. Thirdly, property insurance is for the protection of the value of property, while life insurance is for 
the protection of the value of life, as it is important for the insured’s beneficiaries to have a financial source 
for a living when the life insured has died and is no longer able to financially support the beneficiaries. 
137. Y.C. Zhang, "Application of Incontestability Clause in Chinese Insurance Law", 
http://www.civillaw.com.cn/article/default.asp?id=56734 [Accessed 22 March 2016]. 
138. In the Insurance Law 2009, the section of General Provisions consists of art.10 to art.30. These articles 
apply to both property insurance and life insurance. Articles 31–47 are concerned with life insurance 
contracts; arts 48–66 deal with property insurance contracts. 
139. Such as a construction insurance contract. 
140. This will be discussed shortly. 
141. There are other circumstances where the insurer is entitled to rescind the contract. For example, where the 
insured is in breach of the duty of notification of increase of risk during the insurance period, the insured 
can rescind the contract (art.54 of the Insurance Law 2009). For more, see Z. Jing, "The Insured’s 
Post-contract Duty of Notification of Increase of Risk: A Comparative Perspective" [2013] J.B.L. 842. 
142. Insurance Law 2009 art.31. For more on insurance interest in life insurance in China, see Z. Jing "Insurable 
Interest in Life Insurance: a Chinese Perspective" [2014] J.B.L. 337. 
143. Anctil v Manufacturers Life Insurance Company [1899] A.C. 604. The incontestable clause was a good 
answer to innocent misrepresentation, but not a good answer to a wager policy. 
144. Life Assurance Act 1774 s.1; Insurance Law 2009 art.31. 
145. Insurance Law 2009 art.16(2). 
146. Insurance Law 2009 art.16(3). 
147. This case was decided by the Intermediate People’s Court, Nan Yang City, Henan Province, Civil Court 
Judgment (2011) No 498, and is reported in The Annual Report of the Typical Insurance Cases (2012), 
Vol.4, p.130. 
148. In a similar case, Mrs Huang v Life Insurance Company Xiang Tan Branch (decided by the Intermediate 
People’s Court, Xiang Tan City, Hunan Province, Civil Court Judgment (2011) No.71, and reported in The 
Annual Report of the Typical Insurance Cases (2012), Vol.4, p.133), Mrs Huang insured her husband’s life. 
He fell over and died in hospital. Upon investigation of his medical record, the insurer became aware on 19 
November 2010 of the fact that the life insured had coronary heart disease before the contract was 
concluded, but Mrs Huang did not disclose this material fact to the insurer at the time when the contract 
was concluded. The insurer rejected Huang’s claim and also rescinded the contract on 8 March 2011. The 
court held that the insurer lost his right to rescind the contract because from the date when he knew the 
fact of insured’s non-disclosure to the date when he rescinded the contract, more than 30 days had passed. 
The contract remained valid, and the insurer was liable for paying the insurance benefit. 
149. See X.M. Xi, Understanding the Supreme People’s Court Second Interpretation on Certain Questions 
Concerning the Application of the Insurance Law of the Peoples’ Republic of China (People’s Court Press, 
2014), p.206. 
150. SPC Interpretation (2) art.8. This is similar to English law, under which the insurer cannot refuse to pay a 
claim on the ground of non-disclosure or misrepresentation, yet keep the contract alive for the future (West 
v National Motor & Accident Union [1955] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 207 CA), unless the contract provided otherwise 
(Tilley & Noad v Dominion Ins. Co Ltd (1987) 284 E.G. 1056). See M. Clarke, The Law of Insurance 
Contracts, 6th edn (London: Informa, 2009), para.23-17C. 
151. SPC Interpretation (2) art.7. 
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152. Hemmings v Sceptre Life [1905] 1 Ch. 365 Ch D; Holdsworth v L. & Y. Insurance (1907) 23 T.L.R. 521; 
Ayrey v British Legal & United Provident Assurance Co Ltd [1918] 1 K.B. 136 KBD; Simon, Haynes, Barlas 
& Ireland v Beer (1944) 78 Ll. L.R. 337 KBD; Frans Maas (UK) Ltd v Sun Alliance & London Insurance Plc 
[2004] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 484 QBD at [63]. 
153. Insurance Law 1995 art.16(2) and Insurance Law 2002 art.17(2) are exactly the same, providing: "The 
insurer shall have the right to rescind the insurance contract where the proposer intentionally conceals the 
facts and fails to perform his duty of disclosure and truthful representation of information to the insurer or 
negligently fails to perform such duty, so that the failure of disclose or representation shall sufficiently 
influence the insurer’s decision on whether he will accept the insurance or raise the premium rate." 
154. This case is cited in B.X. Jiang, Insurance Disputes (Law Press China, 2014), p.223. 
155. In English law, refusal to pay a claim while not declaring avoidance of the contract and making a return of 
premium is evidence of an intent to affirm the contract (Simon Haynes & Barlas v Beer (1946) 78 Lloyd’s 
Rep. 337; West v National Motor Accident & Insurance Union [1955] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 207). 
156. This rule is provided in art.5(2) of the Supreme People’s Court First Interpretation on Certain Questions 
Concerning the Application of the Insurance Law of the Peoples’ Republic of China (14 September 2009). 
157. Insurance Law 2009 art.16(3). 
158. See "How can a beneficiary benefit from the incontestability clause" (14 August 2010), 
http://china.findlaw.cn/info/baoxian/sybx/bkkb/128142.html [Accessed 22 March 2016]. 
159. This case is reported in Y.L Dai and G.Q. Chen, Lawyers Show You How to Make a Lawsuit: Insurance 
Disputes and Cases (China Economic Publishing House, 2013), p.9. 
160. Insurance Law 2009 art.19 provides: "The following terms and conditions in an insurance contract 
concluded by adopting the standard clauses provided by the insurer shall be invalid: (i) those that exempt 
the insurer of the obligations that the insurer should have born according to law or that aggravate the 
obligations of the proposer and the insured; and (ii) those that deny the proposer, the insured or the 
beneficiary the rights that they should have been entitled to according to law." 
161. Insurance Law 2009 art.19. 
162. There is another kind of exclusion clause in insurance policies, in which the insurer lists the risks which are 
not covered. For instance, the insurer may exclude liability where the insured dies while piloting a 
helicopter. In other words, this risk of piloting a helicopter is not covered by the policy. In this situation, the 
incontestability clause should not operate to bar the insurer’s defences pertaining to the policy’s coverage. 
If the incontestability clause took away the insurer’s defences based on coverage, the effect of the clause 
would be to expand coverage that never existed in the first place. 
163. Derry v Peek (1889) 14 App. Cas. 337 HL at 374, where Lord Herschell defined what must be proved. 
164. This case was cited in Y.H. Zhou, The Latest Insurance Law and Doctrines: Cases, Materials and Problems 
(2008), p.508. 
165. The payment was made in a meeting organised by the insurer. Many local people attended the meeting. 
The event received a great deal of interest from the press and the local people. See 
http://china.findlaw.cn/info/baoxian/bxfal/317015.html [Accessed 22 March 2016]. 
166. In China, a household must register with a local Public Security Bureau. A Household Registration Book 
(HRB) is given to every household which shows the records of date of birth, sex, job of every member of the 
household and address of the household. The HRB can be used as an ID document. All information on an 
ID card comes from the records in the HRB. 
167. Insurance Law 2002 art.138 provides: "An applicant, an insured or a beneficiary, who commits insurance 
fraud by means of any of the following acts, which constitutes a crime, shall be investigated for his criminal 
responsibility in accordance with law:  
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(1)in the case of the applicant, deliberately fabricating the subject matter of the 
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